Deep Ecology and End-of-Life Care by Carrick, Paul
Philosophy Faculty Publications Philosophy
10-2009
Deep Ecology and End-of-Life Care
Paul Carrick
Gettysburg College
Follow this and additional works at: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/philfac
Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons, and the Philosophy Commons
Share feedback about the accessibility of this item.
This is the publisher's version of the work. This publication appears in Gettysburg College's institutional repository by permission of
the copyright owner for personal use, not for redistribution. Cupola permanent link: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/philfac/58
This open access article is brought to you by The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College. It has been accepted for inclusion by an
authorized administrator of The Cupola. For more information, please contact cupola@gettysburg.edu.
Carrick, Paul. "Deep Ecology and End-of-Life Care." In Contemporary Bioethics: A Reader with Cases, edited by Jessica Pierce and
George Randels, 704-713. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Deep Ecology and End-of-Life Care
Abstract
Physicians and nurses caring for terminally ill patients are expected to center their moral concerns almost
exclusively on the needs and welfare of the dying patient and the patients family. But what about the
relationship of traditional medical ethics to the emerging new theories of environmental ethics, like deep
ecology? As we glide into the twenty-first century, can anyone seriously doubt that the mounting global
concerns of environmental ethics will eventually influence the ethics of medicine too?
For example, suppose physicians were to integrate the core values of an ecocentric environmental ethic like
deep ecology into contemporary North American norms of healthcare for the dying. How would this shift
affect the attitudes and treatment decisions of caregivers toward the terminally ill? Specifically, would the
medical community’s adoption of the deep ecology ethic help or hurt the interests of the dying and their
families? [excerpt]
Keywords
terminally ill, deep ecology, medical ethics
Disciplines
Bioethics and Medical Ethics | Philosophy
This article is available at The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/philfac/58
Contemporary 
Bioethics
A Reader with Cases
Jessica Pierce
University of
Colorado Health Sciences Center
George Randels
University of the Pacific
New York Oxford
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
2010
Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further
Oxford University’s objective of excellence 
in research, scholarship, and education.
Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto
With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece 
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore 
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Copyright © 2010 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.
198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 
http://www.oup.com
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, 
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, 
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, 
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Contemporary bioethics : a reader with cases I [edited by] Jessica Pierce, George Randels. 
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-531382-6 (textbook) — ISBN 978-0-19-973637-9 (instructor’s manual on CD) 
I. Pierce, Jessica, 1965- II. Randels, George.
QH332.C658 2010
174’.957—dc22 2009032268
Printing number: 987654321
Printed in the United States of America 
on acid-free paper
704 CHAPTER 8: THE ENVIRONMENTAL TURN IN BIOETHICS
Deep Ecology and End-of-Life Care
PAUL CARRICK
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 8 (1999): 107-17, 250-56.
Whoever wishes to pursue properly the sci­
ence of medicine, must proceed thus. First he 
ought to consider what effects each season of 
the year can produce . .. The next point is the 
hot winds and the cold, especially those that 
are universal... He must consider the proper­
ties of the waters... The soil, too, whether bare 
and dry or wooded and watered . . . Through 
these considerations . . . [the physician] will 
have full knowledge of each particular case, 
will succeed best in securing health, and will 
achieve the greatest triumphs in the practice 
of his art.
—Hippocrates, 5th Century B.C. 
Airs Waters Places
Introduction
Physicians and nurses caring for terminally ill 
patients are expected to center their moral con­
cerns almost exclusively on the needs and welfare 
of the dying patient and the patients family. But 
what about the relationship of traditional medi­
cal ethics to the emerging new theories of envi­
ronmental ethics, like deep ecology? As we glide 
into the twenty-first century, can anyone seri­
ously doubt that the mounting global concerns 
of environmental ethics will eventually influence 
the ethics of medicine too?
For example, suppose physicians were to 
integrate the core values of an ecocentric envi­
ronmental ethic like deep ecology into contem­
porary North American norms of healthcare 
for the dying. How would this shift affect the 
attitudes and treatment decisions of caregivers 
toward the terminally ill? Specifically, would the 
medical community’s adoption of the deep ecol­
ogy ethic help or hurt the interests of the dying 
and their families?
In particular, suppose the dying patient were 
a partisan of the deep ecology philosophy of the 
Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess.1 Would this 
dying patient then feel some added pressure to 
opt for voluntary active euthanasia? In fact, does 
deep ecology implicitly encourage the notion that 
the terminally ill should quit life early in order to 
conserve medical and other valuable resources 
in a world as over-populated by humans as ours? 
And would the adoption of a global environ­
mental ethic such as deep ecology diminish or 
reinforce the autonomy of the dying patient?
In pursuing these issues, I am going to focus 
on conflicts between the scope of traditional 
anthropocentric medical ethics and global eco­
centric environmental ethics. My thesis is that 
in its noble effort to upgrade the value of non­
human animal and plant life and to redirect our 
moral attention to caring for the broader biotic 
community, deep ecology in effect downgrades 
the value of human individuals living now. This 
is particularly so for those who are aged, chron­
ically sick, and terminally ill. To be sure, I will 
raise questions about what I call the tendency 
toward “environmental paternalism.” I will 
argue that we should be cautious of importing 
global environmental ethical theories into our 
healthcare ethics precisely because these envi­
ronmental theories, often with the best inten­
tions, may undermine respect for individual 
human life.
My plan of inquiry is threefold. First, I will 
introduce the case study of Mildred Vander- 
wall, a terminally ill patient. This case will illus­
trate some possible moral stresses and conflicts 
experienced by patients newly diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s disease and flirting with suicide. 
Second, I will explicate and critically discuss 
some of the leading concepts and principles 
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associated with Naess’s deep ecology program. I 
will suggest how this program, should it become 
influential in society, might affect the attitudes 
and medical choices of caregivers and terminally 
ill patients. Last, I will extrapolate from this case 
to explore some of the larger implications of the 
deep ecology ethic for healthcare ethics gener­
ally. Admittedly, it is bold to imagine that phy­
sicians or patients will become deep ecologists 
or environmental partisans any time soon. Even 
so, by exploring the cross currents of environ­
mental ethics and healthcare ethics, this essay 
reveals some of the particulars of their uneasy 
marriage.
The Case of Mildred Vanderwall
Mildred Vanderwall, age 61, was recently diag­
nosed with Alzheimer’s disease. She is in the 
early stages and may live for 8 to 10 years before 
Alzheimer’s takes her life.
An accomplished symphony musician and 
a divorced mother of three adult children, Mil­
dred’s failing memory led her to resign her 
violinist position two months ago with the 
Cleveland Symphony Orchestra. She took early 
retirement, declining a European tour that was 
to have begun later in the year.
Just last month, Mildred was informed by her 
personal physician, Dr. Stanley Rosenbaum, of 
the inevitable course of Alzheimer’s. She intends 
to live independently as long as she can. As her 
powers slip, she intends to move into a nursing 
care facility. She is frightened by the hopelessness 
of her diagnosis, a diagnosis currently shared by 
four million Americans nationwide. Yet she has 
vowed not to be a burden to her adult children. 
The thought of suicide has entered her head.
Mildred learns that there is no single test 
for Alzheimer’s. She learns that it is diagnosed 
by ruling out all other likely diseases. She also 
learns that there is no cure, and that only one 
drug, Tacrine, is FDA-approved specifically for 
Alzheimer’s. She discovers that Tacrine slows 
somewhat the onslaught of the debilitating symp­
toms. Mildred tries to comprehend that she will 
in time become a total stranger to herself—she 
will experience a total loss of her core identity, 
her sense of being human in the world.
This unalterable fact depresses her. The option 
of suicide never completely fades even though 
she is being treated with the antidepressant 
Zoloft ". She is also currently in individual coun­
seling biweekly with a geriatric psychotherapist.
Fundamentally, Mildred Vanderwall believes 
in God; she is a practicing Lutheran. Though she 
has flirted with thoughts of suicide, four months 
have now passed since Mildred received her 
Alzheimer’s diagnosis. Following a personal visit 
by her pastor, Reverend Turner, she now feels 
opposed to both voluntary active euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide. She feels this would 
be for her a cowardly and sinful way out. (Her 
rejection of physician-assisted suicide also con­
forms to current Lutheran church doctrine.)
End-of-Life Decisions
In exploring some of the links between tradi­
tional medical ethics and environmental ethics, 
and with an eye toward anticipating some of the 
ethical implications of physician-assisted suicide 
for the terminally ill (an option recently reviewed 
and denied by the U.S. Supreme Court), I begin 
with three observations.
First, Mildred’s opposition to voluntary active 
euthanasia for the terminally ill is defensible on 
moral if not also on religious grounds. I will offer 
a brief sketch of this defense shortly and at least 
show that it cannot be easily dismissed.
Second, stock environmental ethics concerns 
about the global impact of human overpopula­
tion, or worries about depleting limited medical 
or other resources resulting from longterm care 
of Alzheimer’s patients like Mildred, challenge 
but do not defeat moral resistance to voluntary 
active euthanasia.
Third, one of the primary benefits to discus­
sions of medical ethics derived from environ­
mental ethics is that the latter’s broader, global 
concerns invite us to weigh more carefully sev­
eral significant metaphysical questions that are 
seldom introduced by medical ethics investiga­
tions alone. These grand questions include:
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1) Where does humanity fit into the general 
scheme of things?
2) What, if any, moral obligations to end their 
lives do the infirm or dying elderly owe to 
future, unborn generations?
3) What moral consideration do humans owe 
to nonhuman life, like hemlock trees, ante­
lope, or chimpanzees with whom we share 
this planet?
A Metaphysical Mind-Shift
Arne Naess and his leading American disciples, 
Bill Devall and George Sessions, have sketched 
or hinted at tentative answers to these three ques­
tions. In an effort to explicate the core ideas of the 
deep ecology mindset, let us turn to their theses.
For example, in answer to (1), Where does 
humanity fit into the general scheme of things?, 
their doctrine of biocentric equality asserts that 
humanity is not privileged: people are only a part 
of nature.2 Humanity has no greater or lesser 
inherent value as a life form than any other liv­
ing thing.’
In answer to (2), What, if any, moral obliga­
tions to end their lives do the infirm or dying 
elderly owe to future, unborn generations?, the 
deep ecology view suggests that the infirm elderly 
and dying may owe to future generations of 
humans (and other nonhuman life forms too) the 
moral duty not to linger when the quality of their 
lives is profoundly reduced by the ravages of dis­
ease. Why? Because to prolong human life when 
that life is not capable any longer of reaching 
its species-defined potential—due to disease or 
decrepitude—contradicts the deep ecology ideal 
of the mature “ecological self,” a self that all must 
strive to attain. As Devall and Sessions clarify, in 
deep ecology “the sense of self requires a further 
maturity and growth, an identification which 
goes beyond humanity to include the nonhuman 
world” and our impact as humans on that world.4
That is, one must think beyond one’s own self­
ish needs in the present to the needs of nonhu­
mans and other life forms and what is best for the 
posterity of the earth in the long run. This consti­
tutes a radical new vantage point from which to 
experience oneself in relation to other beings and 
to nature. If adopted by healthcare professionals, 
this perspective also implies that those nurturing 
the dying need to rethink whether their support 
and resources might be better spent nurturing 
the larger, equally valuable biotic community. 
No doubt to some this sort of question smacks of 
inhumane, environmental hubris. But to others 
it marks a long overdue correction in the reset­
ting of global healthcare priorities. For example, 
is it not much more fiscally and environmentally 
prudent to encourage physician-assisted suicide 
for the dying rather than to encourage the dying 
to hang on in their usual misery or reduced qual­
ity of life?
For reasons to be explored below, I person­
ally remain skeptical of the therapeutic implica­
tions of deep ecology for the humane practice of 
medicine.
Finally, in answer to (3), What moral consid­
erations do humans owe to non-human life?, it 
follows from Naess’s deep ecology framework 
that the moral duties that humans owe to nonhu­
mans may at times be equivalent in moral force 
to those duties that humans customarily owe 
only to each other. To elaborate:
Biocentric equality is intimately related to all- 
inclusive self-realization in the sense that if we 
harm the rest of Nature then we are harming 
ourselves. There are no boundaries and every­
thing is interrelated. But insofar as we perceive 
things as individual organisms or entities, the 
insight draws us to respect all human and non- 
human individuals in their own right as parts 
of the whole without feeling the need to set up 
hierarchies of species with humans on top.5
To further summarize, Naess’s deep ecol­
ogy “eco-sophy” (as he dubs it) declares that 
human communities will live in cooperation 
with nature provided that at least two conditions 
are met: (1) each person’s self-identification with 
nature is regularly practiced as a set of personal 
habits; and (2) the biocentric equality of all liv­
ing things is accepted as a moral starting point. 
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Again, self-realization means that each individu­
al’s spiritual growth must transcend the isolated, 
competitive human ego, maturing to experience 
the oneness and harmony of the entire biotic 
community. Relatedly, biocentric egalitarianism 
means that all living things, including humans, 
plants, animals, and even rivers, mountains, and 
ecosystems, are of equal moral worth, of equal 
intrinsic value. The revolutionary ethical credo is 
that humans are not above or outside of nature. 
Nor should humans continue to view themselves 
in such a pre-Darwinian, ignorant way.
Moreover, no account of the deep ecology 
philosophy would be complete without mention 
of Naess’s formula for right living:
“Rich life, simple means.”
In a 1995 essay Naess states that this aphorism 
“suggests for medical bioethics a strengthen­
ing of preventive medicine, and a reduced reli­
ance on technologically advanced treatments— 
especially if they require large investments of 
resources and energy.” He concludes, “Medical 
bioethics can learn from ecological bioethics 
the need for a moral vision that can reorder its 
priorities.”6
Respect for Human Life
Let us return to the case of Mildred Vanderwall. 
We recall her eventual opposition to voluntary 
active euthanasia, especially following her dis­
cussion with her pastor. At least two sturdy argu­
ments can be marshaled in support of Mildred’s 
rejection of voluntary active euthanasia. The first 
is the secular respect for human life argument. 
The second is the theological sanctity of human 
life argument. Although Mildred adheres to the 
theological version especially, each has deep 
roots in our Western ethical heritage.
The secular version of the respect for human 
life argument says that human life has moral 
worth in and of itself. Why? Precisely because 
human life is the highest known form of life. 
Furthermore, human life is asserted to have a 
basic dignity, intelligence, and autonomy set­
ting it apart from all other creatures. Therefore, 
to willfully destroy human life—except possi­
bly in self-defense or to prevent an even greater 
evil—is wrong. But voluntary active euthanasia 
willfully destroys a human life. Therefore, it is 
wrong. On this particular argument, the act of 
killing a person is not wrong because it produces 
a social disutility like, say, removing a gainfully 
employed citizen from the tax rolls. Rather, it is 
wrong because human life is inherently valuable, 
irrespective of what people can or cannot con­
tribute to their society.
What about the theological sanctity of human 
life argument, which also condemns voluntary 
active euthanasia? A standard version of this argu­
ment arises from the notion that human life is a gift 
from God. For example, Aquinas writes, “it belongs 
to God alone to pronounce sentence of death or 
life.. . ,”7 We are, in effect, trustees of this unique 
life. According to this argument, then, human life is 
a divine-like, special gift. Therefore, to willfully end 
one’s own life via active euthanasia offends God. 
Indeed, such human ingratitude is morally repug­
nant and sinful. It falls far short of God’s moral law 
as expressed in the Old and New Testaments.
Of course, some philosophers would dismiss 
this and similar theological arguments. For one 
thing, they demand a compelling proof for the 
existence of a purposive, caring God of the sort 
this argument requires. However, it deserves 
repeating that this is a theological argument, not 
a philosophical one. Hence, as Tom Beauchamp 
has pointed out, if theology provides reasons that 
are valid independently of philosophy, as a variety 
of religious traditions have insisted (for example, 
revealed truths, miracles, prophecies, etc.), then 
philosophical objections to such arguments are 
far from fatal.8 For this reason, Mildred Vander- 
wall’s religious objections to voluntary active 
euthanasia cannot be discounted. She has a fair 
point if one grants that there may indeed exist 
theological, revealed truths in our universe.
Yet how different these two arguments look— 
the secular respect for human life argument and 
the theological sanctity of human life argument— 
when weighed against the implied force of Naess’s 
deep ecology program. As I will show, deep ecol­
ogy tends to undermine these arguments.
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Take, for example, two related claims. The first 
claim is that long-term care of doomed Alzheim­
er’s patients is morally questionable because it 
squanders valuable and limited medical and 
other resources. These resources could be more 
usefully pressed into the service of the biotic 
community elsewhere. For example, according 
to one study, Mildred and her family will incur 
individual expenses exceeding $213,000 during 
the usual 4 years between diagnosis and death 
from Alzheimer’s.
The second claim is that long-term care of 
doomed Alzheimer’s patients is morally ques­
tionable because in the wake of global human 
overpopulation, the dying aged are too great a 
burden on the entire ecosystem—fellow humans, 
other living things, the whole planet.
So on this account not only is there nothing 
wrong morally with voluntary active euthanasia 
for those who are terminally ill, should a patient 
like Mildred elect it. What’s more, there may be 
a prima facie duty to quit life in such terminally 
ill circumstances based on global environmental 
considerations such as air, land, and water pol­
lution; deforestation; ozone depletion; global 
warming; loss of biodiversity. That is, most of this 
environmental destruction and biological impov­
erishment identifies the swelling human popula­
tion as a major cause of these ecological ills.
To be sure, the balancing and regulation of 
human populations, human goods and services, 
and their global impact ultimately involve ques­
tions of individual human worth and distributive 
justice. For example, should we redistribute our 
healthcare resources away from those who are 
hopelessly ill and toward those who are healthy, 
those who are recovering, and the young?
Deep Ecology and Healthcare Ethics
To briefly explore the force of this last query, con­
sider that deep ecologists (as opposed to shallow, 
strictly human-centered ecologists, in Naess’s lan­
guage) assert that our dominant Western world 
view is responsible for much of the world’s cur­
rent environmental degradation. Therefore, we 
need an alternative world view to the flawed 
Judeo-Christian or capitalist-dominated perspec­
tive held by most medical practitioners in the 
richer, first world nations. Part of the alternative 
world view of deep ecology is borrowed from 
Eastern philosophies like Hinduism, Buddhism, 
and Taoism.9 These are oriental religious traditions 
that tend to see humans as fully integrated into 
nature rather than dominating nature (as in the 
typically Western schema). Another part of deep 
ecology’s alternative world view is taken from the 
pages of evolutionary biology and scientific ecol­
ogy: namely, the notion that all life forms func­
tion as an interdependent holistic web, no part of 
which is completely isolated from any other.
In this section, I shall show how deep ecolo­
gy’s alternative world view, coupled with a pair of 
its central platform principles, pushes terminally 
ill patients in the direction of physician-assisted 
suicide.
Naess and Sessions have articulated a platform 
of eight “eco-philosophical” principles as both a 
summary and a decidedly pacifistic call to arms. 
These eight principles are designed to provide 
a core platform around which the eclectic deep 
ecology movement can be deployed worldwide 
by local and regional activists, who sometimes 
call themselves “eco-warriors.”10 With an eye to 
the moral endorsement or condemnation of vol­
untary active euthanasia for Alzheimer’s or other 
terminal patients, only two of these eight prin­
ciples will be investigated here:
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures 
is compatible with a substantial decrease of 
the human population. The flourishing of 
non-human life requires such a decrease, 
[population reduction principle]
7. The ideological change [needed] is mainly 
that of appreciating life quality . . . rather 
than [humans] adhering to a high standard 
of living.... [life quality principle]11
These two crucial social policy norms associated 
with the deep ecology program together have 
often-overlooked implications for the humane 
practice of medicine.
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How do Naess and Sessions defend the popu­
lation reduction principle? Their starting point 
is that high human population growth rates 
in many developing countries will ultimately 
diminish the quality of life for millions of people 
across the globe.
Like many areas of debate in environmental 
law and public policy, these two principles are 
easily adapted to consequentialist (or results- 
based) reasoning. For example, the population 
reduction principle tacitly alludes to the fact 
that in less than 60 years our human popula­
tion is projected to almost double, going from 
6.3 billion today to perhaps over 10 billion by 
the year 2050.
What’s more, the related life quality prin­
ciple almost certainly invites a consequential­
ist argument favoring a prima facie duty for 
the terminally ill to seek a form of voluntary 
active euthanasia. Again, this life quality prin­
ciple asserts that the quality of human life 
must be our chief moral concern, not the mere 
quantity. In addition, this principle is compat­
ible with a cost-benefit perspective according 
to which prolonging a nonproductive human 
life unjustly drains limited medical and other 
resources12 This last claim may be asserted 
even though, ironically, the whole notion of 
what a life worth living is defies any precise 
definition by strictly quantitative methods of 
assessment.
We are now ready to uncover the more opaque 
implications of the deep ecology framework. I 
suggest that, overall, unanswered momentous 
questions and conflicting moral duties abound.
Deep Ecology and Patient Care
Broadly construed, how would the deep ecology 
philosophy of Arne Naess, George Sessions, 
and William Devall reshape Western medi­
cine? Specifically, how would this philosophy 
challenge the time-tested quartet of bioethical 
principles: autonomy, beneficence, justice, and 
nonmaleficence?15 Would patients and their 
caregivers be better or worse off were the deep 
ecology paradigm shift to go through?
Autonomy
Take the concept of patient autonomy. This 
notion requires that the competent patient be 
understood as a self-determining agent of his 
or her own aims, goals, or destiny. In my view, 
under the influence of deep ecology this concept 
would now be regularly overridden by what I 
have dubbed ecological paternalism. By ecologi­
cal paternalism, I mean that the proposed actions 
of an individual or group may be overridden by 
an informed judgment of the long-term negative 
consequences likely to result from these pro­
posed actions on the local, regional, or global 
environment.
Incidentally, who would be licensed to make 
this patient care judgment? Perhaps a specially 
trained and duly appointed, environmentally 
sensitive hospital committee of some sort. Or 
alternatively, a deep ecology healthcare expert— 
that is, someone highly educated in the nuances 
of holistic environmental philosophy and medi­
cine. Or someone who would competently and 
compassionately monitor a hospital’s global 
environmental interests within the patient care 
matrix of curing and caring? In any case, such 
critically important questions about the chain 
of command and scope of medical decision­
making are studiously ignored by the propo­
nents of deep ecology. This is most peculiar, for 
the individual patient and his or her medical 
team would certainly be required to yield to the 
directives of a higher moral authority associated 
with the utopian thinking of these deep ecology 
visionaries.
To illustrate, take the case of George, a lung 
cancer patient who wishes to amuse himself in 
the last 6 months of his life by taking his favorite 
chain saw and cutting down a dozen old-growth 
hemlock trees situated on 10 acres of land he 
owns in Pine Grove, Pennsylvania. Neither 
George nor anyone else would be using these cut 
trees. Nor does George intend them to be used. 
His aim is simply to engage in some exercise and 
sheer fun by cutting down these hemlocks that 
he owns. Because no “vital needs” of George 
would be served (to employ Naess’s and Sessions’s 
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vague phrase), and because the trees are of equal 
worth due to the principle of biocentric equal­
ity, Georges joyful chainsawing must be over­
ruled and condemned as morally wrong.14 Typi­
cal of the deep ecology gestalt, the environment 
and specifically the old-growth hemlocks are in 
this scenario a more important consideration 
than the individual’s psychological and physi­
cal wants. This, even though the satisfaction of 
these wants may be completely legal and—on a 
traditional anthropocentric ethical yardstick— 
morally unobjectionable.
Beneficence
Beneficence, the notion that the physician must 
try to practice good deeds primarily for the sake 
of his patient’s health and welfare, will need to be 
modified by deep ecology, too. How so? Because 
its moral scope of concern will now be expanded 
to include not just the patient but the entire sur­
rounding biosphere within which the patient 
lives, works, and plays. So beneficence is, in effect, 
redefined to mean biospherical beneficence.
But what does this mean? Consider Jake, 
another terminally ill, competent patient. Jake 
has colorectal cancer. He refuses to quit smok­
ing because at age 80 he still really likes “his 
smokes,” as he affectionately calls them. Legally 
blind and growing weaker in the last two months 
of his life, smoking is one of life’s few remaining 
pleasures. But the deep ecologist attending phy­
sician would overrule Jake’s autonomous desire 
to continue smoking in the last weeks of his life. 
He would also overrule the hospice nurses who 
wink at Jake’s smoking. This despite the fact that 
their own sense of beneficence toward this par­
ticular patient’s psychological needs is for them 
the morally decisive factor here. The nurses are 
required to confiscate Jake’s cigarettes, which dis­
pleases him greatly and conflicts his caregivers.
It will no longer wash to say, beneficently and 
with an eye also to preserving Jake’s sense of 
autonomy, “let the old gentleman smoke.” Why 
confiscate the cigarettes? Because secondhand 
smoke is polluting too many living things—not to 
mention the unhealthy physical effects on Jake’s 
lungs and heart. Also, the carbon monoxide and 
other harsh pollutants in secondhand smoke are 
in the aggregate threatening to deplete the ozone 
layer. They contribute, also, to acid rain.
So the old anthropocentric healthcare ethic 
is adjusted to ask, What is good for the patient’s 
immediate environment, his household, his sur­
rounding community, and the entire biosphere?
These global considerations would easily 
override Jake’s option to smoke, and that of all 
similarly situated patients.
Justice
Then there is the thorny concept of justice. By 
justice, in this context, I mean primarily the duty 
to render each person what is his or her due. In 
healthcare settings, the concept of justice pres­
ents a variety of rich applications and extensions. 
For example, allocating transplantable organs or 
other scarce medical resources in some fair man­
ner of distribution, or ensuring that every citizen 
has adequate access to medical care. So how does 
the deep ecology program redirect our concern 
about justice, especially distributive justice? In 
my opinion, it does so in at least two ways.
First, deep ecology increases our sensitiv­
ity about what constitutes a just response to the 
needs of nonhuman animals or plants. As we 
saw in the case of George, we should not encour­
age a terminally ill patient to amuse himself by 
cutting down old-growth trees even on his own 
property. This is so not simply because such con­
duct is wasteful of trees. That would be a mere 
instrumental reason; it still ignores the alleged 
inherent worth of the trees as valuable beings in 
and of themselves. What’s more, following from 
deep ecology’s twin principles of self-realization 
and biocentric equality, this conduct is blame­
worthy because it is unjust both to the trees 
and to the patient’s own sense of his discerning 
“ecological self,” to use Naess’s mysterious meta­
physical language.
Second, deep ecology increases the sensitiv­
ity of the first world peoples living in the North­
ern, developed nations to the often unhealthy 
living conditions of the people in the Southern, 
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developing nations. For example, consider 
that 99% of all infectious diseases occur in the 
developing nations.15 Also, in these same coun­
tries, 80% of all diseases are caused by con­
suming water contaminated with pathogens or 
pollution.16 The point is that since deep ecol­
ogy’s eight platform principles also declare (in 
principle 1) that “the well-being and flourish­
ing of human and nonhuman life on earth have 
value in themselves,” and that “these values are 
independent of the usefulness of the nonhu­
man world to human purposes,” our concept of 
justice must widen dramatically.17 It must now 
include not only what is due to each citizen liv­
ing in his or her own society. It must also include 
what is due to all humans living anywhere on 
the planet. So what is due to starving Ethiopians 
or malnourished Haitian children becomes as 
pressing a question morally as what is due to the 
endangered elephant or bald eagle.
Nonmaleficence
Lastly, there is the keystone value of healthcare 
ethics, nonmaleficence. “[Hjelp or at least do no 
harm,” the Hippocratic physician implored over 
2,000 years ago.18 This is still sound advice in the 
age of high technology medicine. Moreover, this 
specific imperative of nonmaleficence (or non­
injury) is no less crucial for palliative care of the 
terminally ill than it is for acute care patients 
awaiting, say, a kidney transplant. What, then, 
is the likely reframing of this notion of nonma­
leficence if we imagine a paradigm shift in con­
temporary medicine toward an ecocentrically 
oriented deep ecology?
Quite simply, it is this: we must broaden our 
moral commitment of nonmaleficence, parallel 
to our broadened moral commitment of benefi­
cence, in order to include the entire planet within 
the scope of our moral concern. It is imperative 
that we avoid injuring members of the human 
community in the practice of medicine, to be 
sure. Yet the deep ecology gestalt further asserts 
that all members of the biotic community, 
including nonhuman animals, plants, and even 
natural elements, deserve some moral consid­
eration from every caregiver too. Unfortunately, 
such a sweeping scope of moral concern for the 
prima facie duty of nonmaleficence is highly 
impracticable.
To take but one example, deep ecology would 
in one stroke condemn almost all animal experi­
mentation now crucially facilitating much of 
biomedicine’s search for cures to a variety of 
insidious human diseases. To deep ecologists, 
this animal research is morally questionable: 
it causes physical and psychological injury to 
innocent creatures. Most are killed. In fact, vir­
tually all such research animals are sacrificed in 
the caged wheels of biomedical progress (an esti­
mated 17 to 22 million animals annually in the 
United States alone).19
Deep Ecology and Euthanasia
I conjectured that Naess’s deep ecology program 
would endorse active voluntary euthanasia for 
any terminally ill patient who is competent, hurt­
ing, and agreeable to a somewhat earlier than 
usual exit from the ravages of his or her disease. 
I argued further that this endorsement follows 
from Naess’s population reduction principle and 
life quality principle. It also follows from Naess’s 
belief that the human population must be signif­
icantly reduced in order to bring into healthier 
balance all life forms with which Homo sapiens 
share this planet.
What, then, about involuntary euthana­
sia? Could Naess consistently endorse this 
draconian measure? He could not, for at least 
two reasons. First, Naess is on record as oppos­
ing the practices of Nazi medicine and Nazi 
culture. He states, “As deep ecologists, we take 
a natural delight in diversity as long as it does 
not include crude, intrusive forms like Nazi 
culture, that are destructive to others.20 Second, 
he opposes despotic measures of any sort, espe­
cially those crushing to life. He writes, “For 
deep ecology, there is a core democracy in the 
biosphere . .. We have the goal not only of sta­
bilizing human population but also of reducing 
it to a sustainable minimum without revolution 
or dictatorship.21
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It comes as little surprise, therefore, that fol­
lowing from these persistent concerns about 
human overpopulation, the deep ecologists are 
forced by their principles to endorse the practice 
of passive voluntary euthanasia for the termi­
nally ill as morally acceptable. Why? Because by 
declining to use the often high tech, costly rescue 
procedures involved in prolonging or sustaining 
the lives of those who are critically ill, aged, or 
dying, the ecologically mature medical commu­
nity prudently signals to all persons the impor­
tance of conforming to the deep ecology credo, 
“rich life, simple means.” In so doing, it is hoped 
that each person will live into old age for as long 
as nature, and the ecologically sensitive appli­
cation of biomedicine, warrant. Ideally, each 
person will flourish at any stage along life’s con­
tinuum. This will be accomplished by obtaining, 
when required, lower tech medical intervention; 
the discipline of a balanced diet (preferably veg­
etarian); the norms of preventive medicine; and 
the personal habits of regular exercise and sound 
hygiene—until that critical point in the life span 
of each individual is reached when to further 
coax life along one would have to resort to pos­
sibly futile, often painful, and usually expensive 
medical therapies.
Conclusion
I conclude with this caveat: theories of environ­
mental ethics cannot and should not be ignored 
by biomedicine. Doubtless there is much to learn 
from these global calculations. But practically 
speaking, the jury remains out on the worth of 
the deep ecology program, and on an array of 
other ecocentric theories, for the humane practice 
of medicine. For when an environmental theory 
pressures the terminally ill to quit life in favor of 
the global claims of ecological paternalism, then 
the dignity, autonomy, and inherent value of that 
dying patients life are diminished. As the earlier 
case of Mildred Vanderwall showed, a persons 
higher sense of duty to the individual worth of each 
human being, or to God, cannot be dismissed.
Moreover, as we saw, mere appeals to ecologi­
cally paternalistic concerns—such as the alleged 
negative impact of human overpopulation, or 
the alleged misallocation of scarce medical 
resources—that lead to judgments affecting how 
we care for those who are aged, frail, and dying, 
do not automatically trump either the secular or 
theological variants of the respect for human life 
principle. This principle has animated much of 
the caring tradition in the Western healing arts 
since the time of Hippocrates. Indeed, to yield 
that precious ground to any of the environmen­
tal philosophers today would amount to increas­
ingly experiencing the patient as a mere means 
to some fanciful ecological Utopia. Again, if the 
dying patient is construed as a mere means, that 
patient is dispensable.
Precisely because the deep ecology program 
threatens to ignore patient autonomy in favor 
of environmental paternalism, and precisely 
because it tacitly cheapens the value of individ­
ual human life, deep ecology sows the seeds of 
a potentially misanthropic program of medical 
care. Therefore, it ought to be resisted.
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